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Ron van der Meyden
Abstract
Conditional independence reasoning has been shown to be helpful in
the context of Bayesian nets to optimize probabilistic inference, and re-
lated techniques have been applied to speed up a number of logical reason-
ing tasks in boolean logic by eliminating irrelevant parts of the formulas.
This paper shows that conditional independence reasoning can also be
applied to optimize epistemic model checking, in which one verifies that
a model for a number of agents operating with imperfect information
satisfies a formula expressed in a modal multi-agent logic of knowledge.
An optimization technique is developed that precedes the use of a model
checking algorithm with an analysis that applies conditional independence
reasoning to reduce the size of the model. The optimization has been
implemented in the epistemic model checker MCK. The paper reports
experimental results demonstrating that it can yield multiple orders of
magnitude performance improvements.
1 Introduction
Epistemic model checking [14] is a technique for the verification of information
theoretic properties, stated in terms of a modal logic of knowledge, in systems in
which multiple agents operate with imperfect information of their environment.
It has been applied to settings that include diagnosis [8], and reasoning in game-
like settings [15, 16, 32], concurrent hardware protocols [3] and security protocols
[1, 7, 31].
In dealing with imperfect information, the models of epistemic model check-
ing can be viewed as a discrete relative of probabilistic models. The Bayesian
net literature has developed some very effective techniques for the optimization
of probabilistic reasoning based on the elimination of variables and conditional
independence reasoning [19, 24]. Similar ideas have been shown to be applicable
to reasoning in propositional logic [11].
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The contribution of the present paper is to demonstrate that these condi-
tional independence techniques from the Bayesian Net literature can also be ap-
plied in the context of epistemic model checking. We develop a generalization of
these techniques for a multi-agent modal logic of knowledge, that enables model
checking computations for this logic to be optimized by reducing the number of
variables that need to be included in data structures used by the computation.
In epistemic model checking, one represents the model as a concurrent pro-
gram, in which each of the agents executes a protocol in the context of an
environment. We provide a symbolic execution method for generating from this
concurrent program a directed acyclic graph representing the model using sym-
bolic values. Conditional independence reasoning is used to reduce this directed
graph to a smaller one that removes variables that can be determined to be
irrelevant to the formula to be model checked. Epistemic model checking can
then be performed in this reduced representation of the model using any of a
number of approaches, including binary decision diagrams [9] and SAT-based
techniques (bounded model checking [6]).
We have implemented the technique in the epistemic model checker MCK
[14]. The technique developed can be applied for other semantics and algo-
rithms, but we focus here on agents with synchronous perfect recall and model
check the reduced representation using binary decision diagram techniques. The
synchronous perfect recall semantics presents the most significant challenges to
the computational cost of epistemic model checking, since it leads to a rapid
blowup in the number of variables that need to be handled by the symbolic
model checking algorithms.
The paper presents experimental results that demonstrate that the condi-
tional independence optimization yields very significant gains in the performance
of epistemic model checking. Depending on the example, the optimization yields
a speedup as large as four orders of magnitude. Indeed, it can yield linear growth
rates in computation time on examples that otherwise display an exponential
growth rate. It adds significantly to the scale of the examples that can be an-
alyzed in reasonable time, increasing both the number of agents that can be
handled, the length of their protocols, and the size of messages they communi-
cate.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on
the multi-agent epistemic logic that we consider, and on the epistemic model
checking problem. An example of an application of epistemic model checking,
Chaum’s Dining Cryptographers protocol [10] is described in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 recalls Shenoy and Shafer’s valuation algebra, which provides a general
framework for algorithms from both the database and Bayesian reasoning liter-
ature based on variable elimination. A particular instance of this framework is
introduced that is relevant to the present paper. Section 5 describes the notion
of conditional independence (for a discrete rather than probabilistic setting)
that we use, and recalls ideas from the literature that show how conditional in-
dependencies can be deduced in models equipped with a directed acyclic graph
structure. These ideas are then applied to our setting of epistemic model check-
ing. Section 6 illustrates the application of these techniques on the Dining
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Cryptographers problem. We then turn to describing our implementation of
the optimization in MCK. Section 7 describes the symbolic evaluation method
that relates program-based model checking inputs to directed graphs and the
overall structure of the implementation. Section 8 gives the results of exper-
iments that compare performance of the optimized implementation of model
checking with previous implementations. Section 9 concludes with a discussion
of related work and future directions. Appendix A provides additional detail on
the experiments.
2 Background: Epistemic Logic
We begin by recalling some basic definitions from epistemic logic and epistemic
model checking. We first define epistemic Kripke structures and a particular
representation of them that we use in this paper, and then show how, in the
context of model checking, an epistemic Kripke structure provides semantics for
a multi-agent setting in which each agent’s behaviour is described by a program.
2.1 Epistemic Kripke Structures
Let V be a set of atomic propositions, which we also call variables. An assign-
ment for a set of variables V is a mapping α : V → {0, 1}. We write assgt(V )
for the set of all assignments to variables V . We denote the restriction of a
function f : S → T to a subset R of the domain S by f  R.
The syntax of epistemic logic for a set Agts of agents is given by the grammar
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kiφ
where p ∈ V and i ∈ Agts. That is, the language is a modal propositional logic
with a set of modalities Ki, such that Kiφ means, intuitively, that the agent
i knows that φ. We freely use common abbreviations from propositional logic,
e.g., we write φ1 ∨ φ2 for ¬(¬φ1 ∧¬φ2) and φ1 ⇒ φ2 for ¬φ1 ∨ φ2 and φ1 ⇔ φ2
for (φ1 ⇒ φ2) ∧ (φ2 ⇒ φ1). We write vars(φ) for the set of variables occurring
in the formula φ.
Abstractly, an epistemic Kripke structure for a set of variables V is a tuple
M = (W,∼, pi) where W is a set, ∼= {∼i}i∈Agts is a collection of equivalence
relations ∼i on W , one for each agent i, and pi : W → assgt(V ) is a function.
Intuitively, W is a set of possible worlds. The relation u ∼i v holds for u, v ∈W
just when agent i is unable to distinguish the possible worlds u and v, i.e., when
it is in the world u, the agent considers it to be possible that it is in world v,
and vice versa. For a proposition p, the value pi(u)(p) = 1 just when p is true
at the world u. We say that M is finite when it has a finite set of worlds.
The semantics of epistemic logic is given by a ternary relation M,w |= φ,
where M = (W,∼, pi) is a Kripke structure, w ∈W is a world of M , and φ is a
formula. The definition is given recursively, by
1. M,w |= p if pi(w)(p) = 1, for p ∈ V ,
3
2. M,w |= ¬φ if not M,w |= φ,
3. M,w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 if M,w |= φ1 and M,w |= φ2,
4. M,w |= Kiφ if M,u |= φ for all worlds u ∈W with w ∼i u.
Intuitively, the clause for the operator Ki says that Kiφ holds when φ is true
at all worlds that the agent considers to be possible. We write M |= φ when
M,w |= φ for all worlds w ∈W .
For two Kripke structures M = (W,∼, pi) and M ′ = (W ′,∼′, pi′), a bisimu-
lation with respect to a set of variables U ⊆ V is a binary relation R ⊆W ×W ′
such that:
1. (atomic) If uRu′ then pi(u)  U = pi(u′)  U .
2. (forth) If uRu′ and u ∼i v then there exists v′ ∈ W ′ such that u′ ∼i v′
and u′Rv′.
3. (back) If uRu′ and u′ ∼i v′ then there exists v ∈W such that u ∼i v and
vRv′.
If there exists a bisimulation whose projection on the first component is W , and
on the second component is W ′, then we say that the structures are bisimilar
with respect to U , and write MRUM
′. The following result is well-known in
modal logic [4].
Proposition 1. If R is a bisimulation with respect to U and w ∈ W,w′ ∈ W ′
are worlds with wRw′, then for all formulas φ over atomic propositions U , we
have M,w |= φ iff M ′, w′ |= φ. Moreover, if MRUM ′ then M |= φ iff M ′ |= φ.
It will be convenient to work with a more concrete representation of Kripke
structures that treats worlds as assignments to variables. For simplicity, we
assume that all variables are boolean.
Define an epistemic variable structure over a set of variables V to be a tuple
M = (A,O, V ) where A ⊆ assgt(V ) and O = {Oi}i∈Agts is a collection of sets
of variables Oi ⊆ V , one for each agent i. Intuitively, such a structure is an
alternate representation of a Kripke structure, where the indistinguishability
relation for an agent is specified by means of a set of variables observable to the
agent.
Given an epistemic variable structure M = (A,O, V ), we obtain a Kripke
structure ks(M) = (W,∼, pi), with W = A. The relation ∼i for agent i is
defined by u ∼i v when u  Oi = v  Oi. The assignment pi is defined by
pi(w) = w.
Conversely, any (finite) Kripke structure M = (W,∼, pi) over variables V
can be represented as an epistemic variable structure that satisfies the same set
of formulas over V , but may use a larger set of variables to represent states.
The construction uses two sets of additional variables.1 For each equivalence
1We give a simple construction here, but note that the result can be proved using a smaller
set of additional variables, by encoding equivalence classes in binary.
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class c = [w]i of the equivalence relation ∼i, we define a proposition pc,i whose
meaning, intuitively, is that the current world is in the class c of ∼i. Let
V∼ = {p[w]i,i | w ∈W, i ∈ Agts}. For each world w, we also define a proposition
pw that means, intuitively, that the current world is w. Let VW = {pw | w ∈W}.
Let VM = V ∪ V∼ ∪ VW .
We extend the assignment pi(w), which has domain V , to an assignment piw
with domain VM , by defining
• piw(p) = pi(w)(p), for p ∈ V , and
• piw(p) = 1 iff w ∈ [u]i, for p = p[u]i,i ∈ V∼, and
• piw(p) = 1 iff w = u, for p = pu ∈ VW .
Write AW for the set {piw | w ∈W}. Define vs(M) to be the epistemic variable
structure (AW , O), where Oi = {p[w]i,i | w ∈W} for each i ∈ Agts. That is, the
assignments in this structure are the extended assignments piw, and we take the
set of observable variables to be precisely the set of variables V∼ representing
equivalence classes.
Proposition 2. If M is a Kripke structure over variables V , then M is bisimilar
to ks(vs(M)) with respect to V .
Proof. When M has worlds W , the Kripke structure ks(vs(M)) has the same
set of worlds as vs(M), i.e., AW . Consider the relation R ⊆ W × AW defined
by R = {(w, piw) | w ∈ W}. We show that this is a bisimulation between M
and ks(vs(M)).
Note first that R sets up a 1-1 correspondence between W and AW , since if
u, v ∈W with u 6= v then piu(pv) = 0 and piv(pv) = 1, so piu 6= piv. Thus, wRpiu
implies u = w, so pi(w)(p) = piu(p) for all p ∈ V . This gives condition (atomic).
We show that for u, v ∈ W , and i ∈ Agts, we have u ∼i v iff piu ∼i piv
(i.e., for all p ∈ Oi, we have piu(p) = piv(p)). In particular, note u ∼i v implies
[u]i = [v]i, so for all p = p[w]i,i ∈ Oi, we have piu(p) = 1 iff u ∈ [w]i iff u ∼i w
iff v ∈ [w]i iff piv(p) = 1. Conversely, if for all p ∈ Oi, we have piu(p) = piv(p),
then piu(p[v]i,i) = piv(p[v]i,i) = 1, since v ∈ [v]i, and it follows by definition that
u ∈ [v]i, i.e., u ∼i v.
The conditions (forth) and (back) now follow straightforwardly. For (forth),
note that if u ∼ v and uRu′, then u′ = piu. Taking v′ = piv, we have vRv′, and
u′ = piu ∼ piv = v′ from the above. The proof of (back) is similar.
Using Proposition 1, it follows that for all formulas φ, we have M |= φ
iff ks(vs(M)) |= φ. Thus, for purposes of the modal language, it suffices to
work with epistemic variable structures in place of finite Kripke structures.
Henceforth, for an epistemic variable structureM, and world w ofM, we write
M, w |= φ if ks(M), w |= φ and M |= φ if ks(M) |= φ.
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2.2 From Programs to Epistemic Kripke Structures
In the context of model checking, one is interested in analyzing a model repre-
sented as a program. We now show how programs generate a Kripke structure
that serves as their semantics. We work with a very simple straightline pro-
gramming language in which a multi-agent scenario is represented by each of
the agents running a protocol in the context of an environment. The syntax
and operational semantics of this language is shown in Figure 1.
Intuitively, all variables (represented by non-terminal v) in this fragment
are boolean, and e represents a boolean expression. Code C consists of a se-
quence of assignments and randomization statement rand(v), which assigns a
random value to v. Non-terminal a represents an atomic action, either the skip
statement skip, or an atomic statement 〈C〉 consisting of code C that executes
without interference from code of other agents. An agent protocol P consists of
a sequence of atomic actions: protocol  represents termination, and is treated
as equivalent to skip;  to capture that a terminated agent does nothing while
other agents are still running. A joint protocol J , is represented by a statement
of the form P1 || . . . || Pn ∆ CE , and consists of a number of agent protocols
P1, . . . , Pn, running in the context of an environment represented by code CE .
There are two relations in the operational semantics. States s are assign-
ments of boolean variables to boolean values, and we write e(s) for the value
of boolean expression expression e in state s. The binary relation →0 on con-
figurations of type (s, C) represents zero-time state transitions, which do not
change the system clock. The binary relation→1 on configurations of type (s, J)
represents state transitions corresponding to a single clock tick. Thus, C →∗0 
represents that code C runs to termination in time 0. In a single tick transition
represented by →1, we take the next atomic action ai = 〈Ci〉 from each of the
agents, and compose the code Ci in these actions with the code from the envi-
ronment CE to form the code C = C1; . . . Cn;CE . The single step transition is
obtained as the result of running this code C to termination in zero-time.
A system is represented using this programming language by means of a
tuple I = (J, I,O), where J is a joint protocol for n agents, I is a boolean
formula expressing the initial condition, and Q is a tuple of n sets of variables,
with Qi representing the variables observable to agent i.
Given a maximum running time n, a system I = (J, I,Q) is associated to an
epistemic variable structureMn(I) = 〈A,O, V 〉 as follows. A run of length n of
the system is a sequence of states r = s0, s2, . . . , sn, where s0 satisfies the initial
condition I and (s0, J) →1 (s1, J1) →1 . . . →1 (sn, Jn) for some J1, . . . , Jn. If
U is the set of variables appearing in J , we define V to be the set of timed
variables, i.e., the set of variables vt where 0 ≤ t ≤ n. We take A to be the set
of assignments αr to variables V derived from runs r by αr(v
t) = st(v) when
v ∈ U and 0 ≤ t ≤ n. For the perfect recall semantics, which is our focus in this
paper, we define the observable variables Oi for agent i to be the set of timed
variables vt where v ∈ Qi and 0 ≤ t ≤ n.
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e ::= v | ¬v | v ∧ v | v ∨ v | . . .
C ::=  | v := e;C | rand(v);C
a ::= 〈C〉 | skip
P ::=  | a;P
J ::= P || ... || P ∆ C
(s, v := e;C)→0 (s[e(s)/v], C) (s, skip;C)→0 (s, C)
(s, rand(v);C)→0 (s[0/v], C) (s, rand(v);C)→0 (s[1/v], C)
a1 = 〈C1〉 . . . an = 〈Cn〉 C = C1; . . . ;Cn;CE (s, C)→∗0 (t, )
(s, a1;P1 || . . . || an;Pn ∆ CE)→1 (t, P1 || . . . || Pn ∆ CE)
Figure 1: Syntax and Operational Semantics of Programs
3 Example: Dining Cryptographers
We illustrate epistemic model checking and the optimizations developed in this
paper using Chaum’s Dining Cryptographers Protocol [10], a security protocol
whose aim is to achieve an anonymous broadcast. This protocol, both in its basic
form, as well as an extension that is more generally applicable, has previously
been analysed using epistemic model checking [31, 2]. Chaum introduces the
protocol with the following story:
Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favourite
restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been
made with the maitre d’hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously.
One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might
have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptog-
raphers respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment,
but they wonder if NSA is paying. They resolve their uncertainty
fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between
him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only the two of them
can see the outcome. Each cryptographer then states aloud whether
the two coins he can see–the one he flipped and the one his left-hand
neighbor flipped–fell on the same side or on different sides. If one
of the cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what
he sees. An odd number of differences uttered at the table indicates
that a cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates that NSA
is paying (assuming that the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if
a cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything
from the utterances about which cryptographer it is.
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The solution generalizes to any number n of cryptographers C0, . . . , Cn−1 at
the table. We may represent the protocol by means of the following program for
cryptographer i, who is assumed to have a boolean variable paid i that indicates
whether (s)he is the payer. (The program starts running from an initial state
in which the constraint
∨
0≤i<j≤n−1 ¬(paid i ∧ paid j) is satisfied.) We write ⊕
for the exclusive-or.
Ci:
Observed variables: paid i, coini, left i, say0, . . . , sayn−1
Protocol:
coini := rand ;
left i+1 mod n := coini ;
say i := paid i ⊕ coini ⊕ left i
All variables take boolean values. Here rand is the generation of a random
boolean value: in a probabilistic interpretation, the value would be drawn from
a uniform distribution, but for our purposes in epistemic model checking, we
interpret this operation as nondeterministically selecting a value of either 0 or
1. Each cryptographer is associated with a set of variables, whose values they
are able to observe at each moment of time. Note that a cryptographer may
write to a variable that they are not able to observe. In particular, Ci writes to
the variable left i+1 mod n that is observed only by Ci+1 mod n.
We will work with dependency networks that show how the values of variables
change over time. The DC protocol runs for 4 ticks of the clock, (time 0 plus one
tick for each step in the protocol), so we have instances v0 . . . v3 of each variable
v. Figure 2 shows the dependencies between these instances. The figure is to be
understood as follows: a variable vt takes a value that directly depends on the
values of the variables ut−11 . . . u
t−1
n such that there is an edge from u
t−1
j to v
t.
Additionally, there is a dependency between the initial values paid0i captured
using a special variable pinit. (We give a more formal presentation of such
dependency structures below.) The observable variables for agent C0 have been
indicated by rectangles: timed variables inside these rectangles are observable
to C0.
4 Valuation Algebra
Shenoy and Shafer [26, 28] have developed a general axiomatic formalism that
captures the key properties that underpin the correctness of optimization meth-
ods used for a variety of uncertainty formalisms. In particular, it has been
shown that this formalism allows for a general explanation of variable elimina-
tion algorithms and the notion of conditional independence used in the Bayesian
Network literature [19], and applies also in other contexts such as Spohn’s the-
ory of ordinal conditional functions [30]. There is a close connection also to
ideas in database query optimization [22] and operations research [5]. We show
here that Shenoy and Shafer’s general axiomatic framework applies to epistemic
8
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Figure 2: Timed-variable dependency graph after program unfolding
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model checking. This will enable us to apply the variable elimination algorithm
to derive techniques for optimizing epistemic model checking.
4.1 Axiomatic Framework
We begin by presenting Shenoy and Shafer’s framework, following [18]. Let Vars
be a set of variables, with each v ∈ Vars taking values in a set Ωv. For a set X
of variables, the set ΩX = Πx∈XΩx is called the frame of X. Elements of ΩX
are called configurations of X. In case X = ∅, the set ΩX is interpreted as {〈〉},
i.e., the set containing just the empty tuple. We write D for P(Vars).
A valuation algebra is a tuple 〈Φ, dom, e,⊗, ↓〉, with components as follows.
A state of information is represented in valuation algebra by a primitive notion
called a valuation. Component Φ is a set, the set of all valuations, and dom
is function from Φ to P(Vars). Intutitively, for each valuation s ∈ Φ, the
domain dom(s) is the set of variables that the information is about. For a
set of variables X, we write ΦX for the set of valuations s with dom(s) =
X. Component e gives an element eX ∈ ΦX for each X ∈ D. A valuation
algebra also has two operations ⊗ : Φ× Φ→ Φ (combination) and ↓: Φ×D →
Φ(marginalization), with ⊗, intuitively, representing the combination of two
pieces of information, and ↓ used to restrict a piece of information to a given
set of variables. Both are written as infix operators. From marginalization,
another operator − : Φ× Vars → Φ called variable elimination can be defined,
by s−x = s ↓ (dom(s) \ {x}).
These operations are required to satisfy the following conditions:
VA1. Semigroup. ⊗ is associative and commutative. For all X ∈ D and all
s ∈ ΦX , we have s⊗ eX = eX ⊗ s = s.
VA2. Domain of combination. For all s, t ∈ Φ, dom(s⊗ t) = dom(s) ∪ dom(t).
VA3. Marginalization. For s ∈ Φ and X,Y ∈ D, the following hold:
s ↓ X = s ↓ X∩dom(s) dom(s ↓ X) = X∩dom(s) s ↓ dom(s) = s .
VA4. Transitivity of marginalization. For s ∈ Φ, and X ⊆ Y ⊆ Vars,
(s ↓ Y ) ↓ X = s ↓ X .
VA5. Distributivity of marginalization over combination. For s, t ∈ Φ, with
dom(s) = X
(s⊗ t) ↓ X = s⊗ (t ↓ X) .
VA6. Neutrality. For X,Y ∈ D,
eX ⊗ eY = eX∪Y .
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A key result that follows from these axioms, called the Fusion Algorithm
[27], exploits Distributivity of Elimination over Combination to give a way of
computing the result of a marginalization operation applied to a sequence of
combinations, by pushing in variable eliminations over elements of the combi-
nation that do not contain the variable.
For a finite set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} ⊆ Φ, write ⊗S for s1⊗ s2⊗ . . .⊗ sk. We
define the fusion of S via x ∈ Vars to be the set
Fusx(S) = {(⊗S+)−x} ∪ S−
where we have partitioned S as S+ ∪ S−, such that S+ is the set of s ∈ S with
x ∈ dom(s), and S− is the set of s ∈ S with x 6∈ dom(s). That is, in the fusion
of the set S with respect to x, we combine all the valuations with x in their
domain, and then eliminate x, and preserve all valuations with x not in their
domain.
Suppose we are interested in computing (⊗S) ↓ X, for S a finite set of
valuations, and X ⊆ Vars. The Fusion Algorithm achieves this by repeatedly
applying the fusion operation, using some ordering of the variables in X. We
write dom(S) for dom(⊗S) = ⋃{dom(s) | s ∈ S}
Theorem 1 ([27]). Let S be a finite set of valuations, and X ⊆ Vars. Suppose
dom(S) \X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. Then
(⊗S) ↓ X = ⊗Fusxn(. . . (Fusx1(S))) .
Each ordering of the variables x1 . . . xn gives a different way to compute
(⊗S) ↓ X. A well chosen order can yield a significant optimization of the com-
putation, by keeping the domains of the intermediate valuations in the sequence
of fusions small. Finding an optimal order may be computationally complex,
but there exist heuristics that produce good orders in practice [23, 20].
4.2 A Valuation Algebra of Relational Structures
We now show that the relational structures that underly Kripke structures are
associated with algebraic operations that satisfy the conditions from the previ-
ous section. It will follow from this that the Fusion algorithm can be applied to
these structures.
Let V be the set of all variables. Values in the algebra will be relational
structures of the form s = (A, V ), where V ⊆ V and A ⊆ assgt(V ). The domain
of a relational structure is defined to be its set of variables, i.e. if s = (A, V )
then dom(s) = V . We define the identities eX and operations ⊗ of combination
and and ↓ of marginalization as follows. Let s1 = (A1, V1) and s2 = (A2, V2)
and X ⊆ V. Then
• eX = (assgt(X), X),
• s1⊗s2 = (A, V ) where V = V1∪V2, and A ⊆ assgt(V ) is defined by α ∈ A
iff α  V1 ∈ A1 and α  V2 ∈ A2.
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• s1 ↓ X = (A, V ) where V = V1 ∩X, and A = {α  X | α ∈ A1}.
To use terminology from relational databases, s1⊗s2 is the join of relations and
s ↓ X is the projection of the relation s onto attributes X. The following result
is straightforward; these properties are well-known for relational algebra.
Proposition 3. The algebra of relational structures satisfies axioms VA1-VA6.
We may extend the operation of marginalization in this valuation algebra
to epistemic variable structures as follows. If M = (A,O, V ) is an epistemic
variable structure and X ⊆ V , we define M ↓ X = (A′, O′, V ′) where A′ =
{α  X | α ∈ A} and O′i = Oi ∩ X for all i ∈ Agts and V ′ = V ∩ X. In
general, this operation results in agents losing information, since their knowledge
is based on the observation of fewer variables. Below, we identify conditions
where knowledge is preserved by this operation.
5 Conditional Independence and Directed Graphs
5.1 Conditional Independence
Let X,Y, Z ⊆ V be sets of variables. The notion of conditional independence
expresses a generalized type of independency relation. Variables X are said to be
conditionally independent of Y , given Z, if, intuitively, once the values of Z are
known, the values of Y are unrelated to the values of X, so that neither X not Y
gives any information about the other. This intuition can be formalized for both
both probabilistic and discrete models. The following definition gives a discrete
interpretation, related to the notion of embedded multivalued dependencies from
database theory [13].
Definition 1. Let A ⊆ assgt(V ) be a set of assignments over variables V and
let X,Y, Z ⊆ V . We say that A satisfies the conditional independency X⊥Y |Z,
and write A |= X⊥Y |Z, if for every pair of worlds u, v ∈ A with u  Z = v  Z,
there exists w ∈ A with w  X ∪ Z = u  X ∪ Z and w  Y ∪ Z = v  Y ∪ Z.
For an epistemic variable structure M = (A,O, V ), we write M |= X⊥Y |Z if
A |= X⊥Y |Z.
Conditional independencies can be deduced from graphical representations
of models. Such representations have been used in the literature on Bayesian
Nets [24, 19], and have also been applied in propositional reasoning [11, 12].
The following presentation is similar to [11] except that we work with relations
over arbitrary domains rather than propositional formulas.
5.2 Directed Graphs
A directed graph is a tuple G = (V,E) consisting of a set V (the vertices) and
a relation E ⊆ V × V (the edges). If (u, v) ∈ E we say that there is an edge
from u to v, and may also denote this fact by u → v. We write u − v when
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both u→ v and v → u. The set of parents of a node u is defined to be the set
pa(v) = {u ∈ V | u → v}. A path of length n from u to v in G is a sequence
u0, u1, . . . , un of vertices, such that ui → ui+1 for all i = 0 . . . n− 1. The graph
is acyclic if there is no nontrivial path from any vertex to itself. We also call
such a graph a directed acyclic graph, abbreviated as dag. An undirected graph
is a graph with a symmetric edge relation E, i.e. if u→ v then also v → u. We
may represent such a pair of edges with the notation u− v.
The notion of d-separation [24] provides a way to derive a set of independency
statements from a directed graph G. We present here an equivalent formulation
from [21], that uses the notion of the moralized graph Gm of a directed graph
G. The graph Gm is defined to be the undirected graph obtained from G by
first adding an edge u − v for each pair u, v of vertices that have a common
child (i.e. such that there exists w with u→ w and v → w), and then replacing
all directed edges with undirected edges. For a set of vertices X of the directed
graph G, we write An(X) for the set of all vertices v that are ancestors of some
vertex x in S (i.e., such that there exists a directed path from v to x). For a
subset X of the set of vertices of graph G = (V,E), we defined the restriction
of G to S to be the graph GS = (V ∩ S, {(u, v) ∈ E | u, v ∈ S}). For disjoint
sets X,Y, S, we then have that X is d-separated from Y by S if all paths from
X to Y in (GAn(X∪Y ∪S))m include a vertex in S.
A structured model for a valuation algebra 〈Φ, dom, e,⊗, ↓〉, is a tuple M =
〈V,E,S〉 where V is a set of variables, D = P(V ), component E is a binary
relation on V such that GM = (V,E) is a dag, and S = {sv}v∈V is a collection
of values in Φ such that for each variable v ∈ V , we have
• dom(sv) = {v} ∪ pa(v), i.e. the domain of sv consists of v and its parents
in the dag,
• sv ↓ pa(v) = epa(v).
Intuitively, the second constraint says that the relation sv does not constrain
the parents of v: for each assignment of values to the parents of v, there is at
least one value of v that is consistent.
The following is a consequence of results in [24, 21, 33].
Proposition 4. Suppose that M = 〈V,E,S〉 is a structured model and X,Y, Z
are disjoint subsets of the vertices V of the directed graph G = (V,E). If X is
d-separated from Y by Z, then ⊗S |= X⊥Y |Z.
Proof. (Sketch) The set I of conditional independency statements holding in
a structured model is a semi-graphoid. In particular, we will take I to be the
semi-graphoid of conditional independencies in ⊗S.
A stratified protocol L of I is an ordering v1 . . . vn of V together with a
function p : V → P(V ) such that for all i = 1 . . . n, we have that p(vi) ⊆
{v1, . . . , vi−1} and the set I contains the statement
{v1 . . . vi−1} \ p(vi)⊥{vi}|p(vi) .
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Each stratified protocol L is associated with a directed acyclic graph dag(L) =
(V, {(u, v) | v ∈ V, u ∈ p(v)}). It follows from the fact that M is a structured
relational model that any topological sort ofG, together with the parent function
in G as the function p, is a stratified protocol L of I, and we have dag(L) = G.
Verma and Pearl [33](Theorem 2) show that if Z d-separates X from Y in
dag(L) and L is a stratified protocol for a semi-graphoid I, then X⊥Y |Z is in
I. It follows that if Z d-separates X from Y in G then ⊗S |= X⊥Y |Z.
Structured models have an additional property that provides an optimization
when eliminating variables: if a leaf node is one of the variables eliminated from
the combination of the nodes of the graph, then it can be simply removed from
the model without changing the result. This is formally captured in the following
result.
Proposition 5. Suppose that M = 〈V,E,S〉 is a structured model, let X ⊆ V
and let v ∈ V \X be a leaf node. Then ⊗S ↓ X = ⊗(S \ {sv}) ↓ X.
Proof. Let s = ⊗(S \{sv}). By the semigroup properties, we have ⊗S = s⊗ sv.
We first note that
(s⊗ sv) ↓ dom(s) = s⊗ (sv ↓ dom(s)) by VA5
= s⊗ (sv ↓ dom(s) ∩ dom(sv)) by VA3
= s⊗ (sv ↓ pa(v)) since v is a leaf
= s⊗ ev since M is a s.r.m.
= s by VA1.
Hence
(s⊗ sv) ↓ X = (s⊗ sv) ↓ dom(s) ∩X since X ⊆ dom(s)
= (s⊗ sv) ↓ dom(s) ↓ X by VA4
= s ↓ X by the result above.
To apply these results for structured models to model checking epistemic
logic, we use the following definition. We say that a structured model M =
〈V,E,S〉 represents the worlds of an epistemic variable structureM = (A,O,U)
if V = U and A = ⊗S. That is, the structured model captures the set of
assignments making up the epistemic variable structure.
5.3 Eliminating Observable Variables
Consider the following formulation of the model checking problem: for an epis-
temic formula φ, we wish to verifyM |= φ whereM = (A,O, V ) is an epistemic
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variable structure with observable variables O, with worlds represented by a
structured model M = 〈V,E,S〉.
A first idea for how to optimize this verification problem is to reduce the
structureM to the set of variables vars(φ) of the formula φ, on the intuition that
only these variables are relevant to the satisfaction of φ. But this is not quite
correct: the formula may contain the epistemic operators Ki, the semantics
of which refers to the observable variables Oi, since these are used to define
the indistinguishability relation. Thus a more accurate claim is that we should
restrict the structure to vars(φ), together with the sets Oi for any operator Ki
in φ.
In fact, using the notion of conditional dependence, it is often possible to
identify a smaller set of variables that suffices to verify the formula. The intu-
ition for this is that some of the observed variables in Oi may be independent
of the variables in the formula, and moreover, information may be redundantly
encoded in the observable variables. For example, if an observable variable that
does not itself occur in the formula is computed from other observable variables,
then it is redundant from the point of view of determining the possible values
of variables in the formula. The following definitions strengthen the idea of
restricting to vars(φ)∪O by exploiting a sufficient condition for the removal of
observable variables.
Say that κ is a relevance function for a formula φ with respect to an epistemic
variable structure M = (A,O, V ) if it maps subformulas of φ to subsets of the
set of variables V , and satisfies the following conditions:
1. κ(p) = {p} for p ∈ V ,
2. κ(φ1 ∧ φ2) = κ(φ1) ∪ κ(φ2),
3. κ(¬φ1) = κ(φ1), and
4. κ(Kiφ1) = Ui ∪ κ(φ1), for some Ui ⊆ Oi with κ(φ1) ∩ Oi ⊆ Ui and
M |= (κ(φ1) \ Ui)⊥(Oi \ Ui)|Ui.
In the final condition, Ui can be any set. We note that a set Ui satisfying
the condition can always be found. For, if we take Ui = Oi, then the condition
states that κ(φ1) ∩ Oi ⊆ Oi and M |= (κ(φ1) \ Oi)⊥∅|Oi. Both parts of this
statement are trivially true. In practice, we will want to choose Ui to be as
small as possible, since this will lead to stronger optimizations.2
Note that φ is a subformula of itself, so in the domain of κ. The following
result says that satisfaction of φ is preserved when we marginalize to a superset
of κ(φ) for a relevance function κ.
Theorem 2. Suppose that κ is a relevance function for φ with respect to epis-
temic variable structure M and that X is a set of variables with κ(φ) ⊆ X ⊆
dom(M). Then for all worlds w of M, we have M, w |= φ iff M ↓ X,w  X |=
φ.
2We remark also that since (A \C)⊥(B \C)|C is equivalent to A⊥B|C, the independence
condition could be more simply stated as κ(φ1)⊥Oi|Ui. We work with the more complicated
version because the algorithm for d-separation assumes disjoint sets.
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Proof. We prove the result, for all epistemic variable structuresM, by induction
on the structure of φ. Suppose κ(φ) ⊆ X ⊆ dom(M).
For the case φ = p ∈ V , we have κ(φ) = {p}, so p ∈ X. Hence M, w |= φ iff
w(p) = 1 iff (w  X)(p) = 1 iff M ↓ X,w  X |= φ, as required.
In case φ = φ1 ∧ φ2, we have κ(φ) = κ(φ1) ∪ κ(φ2), so κ(φ1) ⊆ X and
κ(φ2) ⊆ X. Hence
M, w |= φ iff M, w |= φ1 and M, w |= φ2
iff M ↓ X,w  X |= φ1 and M ↓ X,w  X |= φ2 (by induction)
iff M ↓ X,w  X |= φ .
The proof for the case φ = ¬φ1 is similar.
In case φ = Kiφ1, we show that M, w |= Kiφ1 implies M ↓ X,w  X |=
Kiφ1, and the converse. Note that the equivalence relation ∼′i used in the
semantics of the operator Ki in M ↓ X is given by v ∼′i w if v  Oi ∩X = w 
Oi ∩X.
For the implication from M, w |= Kiφ1 to M ↓ X,w  X |= Kiφ1, suppose
that M, w |= Kiφ1. Let w  X ∼′i v, where v is a world of M ↓ X. Then
there exists a world u of M such that u  X = v. We need to show that
M ↓ X,u  X |= φ1. Since Ui ⊆ κ(Kiφ1) ⊆ X and Ui ⊆ Oi, we have Ui ⊆
X ∩ Oi. Hence, from w  X ∼′i u  X, we have w  Ui = u  Ui. Thus, from
M |= (κ(φ1)\Ui)⊥(Oi \Ui)|Ui, it follows that there exists a world w′ ofM such
that w′  (Oi \ Ui) ∪ Ui = w  (Oi \ Ui) ∪ Ui and w′  (κ(φ1) \ Ui) ∪ Ui = u 
(κ(φ1) \ Ui) ∪ Ui. Thus, w′  Oi = w  Oi and w′  κ(φ1) = u  κ(φ1). Hence
M, w′ |= φ1 iff M ↓ κ(φ1), w′  κ(φ1) |= φ1 (by induction)
iff M ↓ κ(φ), u  κ(φ) |= φ1 (by w′  κ(φ1) = u  κ(φ1))
iff M, u |= φ1 (by induction)
Since w′  Oi = w  Oi and M, w |= Kiφ1, we have M, w′ |= φ1. Hence
M, u |= φ1. By induction, M ↓ X,u  X |= φ1, as required.
Conversely, suppose that M ↓ X,w  X |= Kiφ1. We show that M, w |=
Kiφ1. For this, let u be a world of M with w  Oi = u  Oi. We need to
show that M, u |= φ1. For this, note that it follows from w  Oi = u  Oi
that w  X  Oi ∩ X = u  X  Oi ∩ X, i.e., w  X ∼′i u  X. Since
M ↓ X,w  X |= Kiφ1, we have thatM ↓ X,u  X |= φ1. Since κ(φ1) ⊆ X, we
have, by induction, that M, u |= φ1, as required.
Computing κ(φ): The definition of κ provides a recursive definition by
which κ(φ) can be calculated, with the exception that the case κ(Ki(φ)) =
Ui∪κ(φ) allows for a choice of the set Ui, subject to the conditions κ(φ)∩Oi ⊆ Ui
and M |= (κ(φ) \ Ui)⊥(Oi \ Ui)|Ui. When the worlds of M are represented by
a structured relational model M , we show how to construct the minimal set
Ui satisfying the stronger conditions that κ(φ) ∩ Oi ⊆ Ui and Ui d-separates
κ(φ) \ Ui from Oi \ Ui in the directed graph G associated with M .
Note (κ(φ) \ Ui) ∪ (Oi \ Ui) ∪ Ui = κ(φ) ∪ Oi for any set Ui. Thus, the d-
separation properties we are interested in are computed in the moralized graph
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H = (GAn(Oi∪κ(φ)))
m, which is independent of Ui. Let U be the set of vertices
v ∈ Oi such that there exists a path in H from a vertex u ∈ κ(φ) \Oi to v, with
v the first vertex on that path that is in Oi. The set U can be constructed in
linear time by a depth first search from κ(φ) \Oi. Take W = U ∪ (κ(φ) ∩Oi).
Proposition 6. W is the smallest set satisfying the strengthened conditions for
Ui.
Proof. We first show that W satisfies the conditions for Ui. Clearly κ(φ) ∩
Oi ⊆ W . We show that κ(φ) \ W is d-separated from Oi \ W by W . Let
u = u0, u1, . . . , un = v be a path in H from u ∈ κ(φ) \W to Oi \W . Since
κ(φ) ∩ Oi ⊆ W , we have u 6∈ Oi. But then the path must cross an edge from
the exterior of Oi into Oi, and the endpoint of that edge is in W , by definition.
This shows that there is no path from κ(φ)\W to Oi \W that avoids W . Thus,
W satisfies the conditions for Ui.
To show that W is the minimal such set, let Ui be any set satisfying the
conditions, and suppose that W 6⊆ Ui. Then there is a vertex v ∈W \Ui. Since
W ⊆ Oi, we have v ∈ Oi \ Ui. We cannot have v ∈ κ(φ) ∩ Oi, since then also
v ∈ Ui. Thus, by definition of W , there exists a path in H from v to some
node in κ(φ) \Oi, with all vertices after v not in Oi, hence also not in Ui since
Ui ⊆ Oi. Note κ(φ) \Oi = κ(φ) \Ui since κ(φ)∩Oi ⊆ Ui. Thus, κ(φ)∩Oi ⊆ Ui
is not d-separated from Oi\Ui by Ui, contradicting the assumptions on Ui. This
shows that W ⊆ Ui.
5.4 Equalities
Unfolding a program into a structured model tends to create a large number of
timed variable instances whose associated value represents an equality between
two variables. Such instances can be eliminated by a simple transformation of
the structured model.
For an assignment α with domain V , define α[y/x] to be the assignment α′
with domain (V \ {x}) ∪ {y} with α(y) = α′(x) and α  (dom(s) \ {x}) = α′ 
(dom(s) \ {x}).
For a relational value s and variables x, y with x ∈ dom(s) and y 6∈ dom(s),
define s[y/x] to be the relational value t with dom(t) = (dom(s) \ {x}) ∪ {y},
consisting of all assignments α[y/x] for α ∈ s. Intuitively, this is simply the
relation s with variable x renamed to y.
We extend this definition to structured relational models M = (V,E,S)
with x, y ∈ V , by defining M [y/x] = (V ′, E′,S ′) with V ′ = V \ {x}, and
E′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′), and S = {s′v | v ∈ V ′}, where s′v = s[y/x]. In the
following result, we write δx,y for the set of assignments α with domain {x, y}
and α(x) = α(y).
Proposition 7. Suppose that M = (V,E,S) is a structured relational model
with x, y ∈ V , and Ωx = Ωy, and pa(y) = {x} and sy = δx,y. Let M [y/x] =
(V ′, E′,S ′). Then ⊗S ′ = (⊗S) ↓ V ′.
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The definition furthermore extends to epistemic models M = (A,O, V )
with worlds represented by a structured relational model M = (V,E,S). Let
M [y/x] = (V ′, E′,S ′). We define M[x/y] = (A′, O′, V ′) where O′ = {O′i}i∈Agts
where O′i = Oi ∪ {y | x ∈ Oi} for each i ∈ Agts, and A′ = ⊗S ′. Note that O′i
additionally makes variable y visible to agent i if x was visible to i, in case this
variable was not originally visible.
Proposition 8. If Ωx = Ωy, and pa(y) = {x} and sy = {(x : a, y : a) | a ∈ Ωx}
then M, α |= φ iff M[y/x], α[y/x] |= φ[y/x].
5.5 Algorithm
The overall optimized procedure for model checking that we obtain from the
above results uses the following steps:
1. We first unfold a program representation of the model into a structured
relational model with symbolically represented values and transform the
query into a form that uses the timed instances variables in place of the
original variables. This can be done in a way that builds in the equality
optimization of Section 5.4. We expand on this step in Section 7.
2. We compute κ(φ) using the algorithm in Section 5.3.
3. We compute a symbolic representation of M  κ(φ), using the leaf node
elimination optimization.
4. We computeM  κ(φ) |= φ in this representation using a symbolic model
checking algorithm.
6 Example
In the present section, we illustrate this procedure on the Dining cryptographers
protocol.
Figure 5 indicates the dependency graph that remains after we have applied
the optimization procedure to the Dining cryptographers problem. We consider
the formula
φ = (¬paid0 ⇒ K0(¬paid1∧¬paid2)∨(K0(paid1∨paid1)∧¬K0paid1∧¬K0paid2)
evaluated at time 3. Transforming to timed form, this is
φ1 = (¬paid30 ⇒ K0(¬paid31∧¬paid32)∨(K0(paid31∨paid31)∧¬K0paid31∧¬K0paid32)
The set of observable variables O0 used for the operator K0 in this formula is
the set of all variables inside the rectangles in Figure 2.
The result of applying the equality optimization to the model is depicted in
Figure 3. The resulting formula is
φ2 = (¬paid00 ⇒ K0(¬paid01∧¬paid02)∨(K0(paid01∨paid01)∧¬K0paid01∧¬K0paid02)
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Figure 3: Depency graph after equality optimization
To construct the moralized graph, we add edges between all vertices in the
sets {paid2i , coin2i , left2i } for i = 0, 1, 2, and replace all directed edges with undi-
rected edges. The result is depicted in Figure 4.
For the computation of κφ, we note that the variables in the scope of the
knowledge operator are paid01 and paid
0
2. The vertices at the outer bound-
ary to the observable variables from these vertices are pinit , paid01, paid
0
2, coin
1
1.
The observable variables reachable in one step from this outer boundary are
paid00, coin
1
0, coin
1
1, say
3
1, say
3
2. Thus, we compute
κ(φ2) = {paid00, paid01, paid02coin10, coin11, say31, say32}
All other variables can be eliminated using the variable elimination algorithm.
As a first step in this process, we can delete leaf nodes not in κ(φ2) (and re-
cursively, any fresh leaf nodes not in κ(φ2) resulting from such deletions.) This
step enables deletion of variables say30 and coin
0
i , left
0
i , say
0
i for i = 0, 1, 2. The
graph resulting from these deletions in depicted in Figure 5.
From the point of model checking complexity, we expect that the simplifica-
tion of the dependency graph will result in significant improved performance of
the model checking computation. For n cryptographers, the initial dependency
graph (Figure 2 for n = 3) has 16n variables, i.e., 48 variables in case n = 3.
The algorithm of van der Meyden and Su [31] would construct a BDD with over
12 + 4n variables in general, and, as show in Figure 6, with 24 variables in case
n = 3. However, the algorithm uses an intermediate BDD representation of
the transition relation of the protocol that requires 8n variables. Instead, the
optimization approach developed here computes a BDD over just 9 variables in
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Figure 6: Timed-variables used in algorithm of van der Meyden and Su.
case n = 3 and 3n variables in general. The actual model checking computation
combines BDD’s associated with each node to construct a BDD over the same
number of variables. Since in practice, BDD algorithms work for numbers of
variables in the order of 100-200, these reductions of the constant factor can
have a significant impact on the scale of the problems that can be solved.
7 From Programs to Dags
We have developed an implementation of the above ideas as an extension of
the epistemic model checker MCK [14]. We sketch the implementation in this
section.
We apply the conditional independence optimization described above on
a structured model derived from the system, in which values are represented
symbolically as formulas. Given a formula to be model checked, we derive a
structured model over a smaller set of vertices using the conditional indepen-
dence optimization. Rather than producing the timed variable dag as in the
discussion of the Dining Cryptographers example above, and then applying the
equational optimization, the initial structured model is obtained by means of a
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symbolic execution that builds in the equational optimization. This symbolic
execution proceeds as follows.
For a set of variables Vars, define an indexing of Vars to be a mapping
γ : Vars → N. If γ is an indexing, and e is an expression, we define the
the expression e/γ, which interprets e with respect to indexed instances of the
variables, by replacing each occurrence of a variable v in e by the indexed
variable vγ(v). Intuitively, vk represents the k-th value taken on by variable
v during the running of the program. (Note that this differs from the timed
variable vk, which represents the value of the variable at time k.)
Consider a system I = (J, I,Q) with joint protocol J = P1 || . . . || Pn ∆ CE .
We can, for each time t up to the maximal running time N of J , obtain the
code at time t, denoted Ct = C
t
1; . . . C
t
n;CE , where the t-th atomic statement
in each Pi is 〈Cti 〉. (At this step, we use the fact that the agent protocols are
straightline.) We construct a sequence of structured models M0, . . . ,MN , and
a sequence of indexings γ0, . . . γN of Vars, as follows.
To represent the initialization condition, we use a variable vinit with frame
Ωvinit equal to the set of assignments over vars(I). (Under our simplifying as-
sumptions, this is a set of assignments to boolean variables; all indexed variables
other than vinit are boolean.)
The initial structured model M0 = 〈V0, E0,S〉 has V0 = {v0 | v ∈ Vars} ∪
{vinit} and E0 = {(vinit, v0) | v ∈ vars(I)}. Write su = (Au, Vu) for the values
S = {su}u∈V0 . The domains of these values are given by Vvinit = {vinit} and
Vv0 = {v0} if v 6∈ vars(I) and Vv0 = {vinit, v0} otherwise. The relations in these
values are symbolically represented Avinit = I, and Av0 = True if v 6∈ vars(I),
otherwise by v0 = v. The indexing γ0 is the initial indexing, which has γ0(v) = 0
for all v ∈ Vars.
Given model Mi, indexing γi and code Ci, we obtain the next model and
indexing in the sequence as (Mi+1, γi+1) = µ(Mi, γi, Ci), where the function µ
is defined by
µ(M,γ, ) = (M,γ)
and
µ(〈V,E,S〉, γ, (b;C)) = (〈V ′, E′,S ′〉, γ′, C)
where, if b is the assignment v := e we have
V ′ = V ∪ {vγ(v)+1}
E′ = E ∪ {(uγ(u), vγ(v)+1) | u ∈ vars(e)}
S ′ = S ∪ {svγ(v)+1}
γ′ = γ[γ(v) + 1/v]
with the relation of svγ(v)+1 symbolically represented by the formula vγ(v)+1 ⇔
e/γ. That is, the function µ processes an assignment statement v := e by
interpreting e with respect to γ, creating a new vertex vγ(v)+1 with parents the
variables in this interpretation e/γ and a value that describes how vγ(v)+1 is
calculated from its parents.
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In case b is the randomization statement rand(v), we take
V ′ = V ∪ {vγ(v)+1}
E′ = E
S ′ = S ∪ {svγ(v)+1}
γ′ = γ[γ(v) + 1/v]
with the relation of svγ(v)+1 symbolically represented by the formula True.
The sequence of indexings γ0 . . . vN relates timed variables to indexed vari-
ables, by the mapping vt 7→ γt(v). Via this mapping, the structured model MN
represents the worlds of the epistemic variable structure MN (I).
In particular, to evaluate an epistemic formula φ at time N , we work with
the model MN and interpret each variable v of φ as the indexed variable γN (v).
In order to determine κ(φ), where φ is a formula to be evaluated at time N , we
use the sets Oi = {vt | v ∈ Qi, 0 ≤ t ≤ γN (v)} of images of observable timed
variables.
After constructing the structured model MN and computing the set of rel-
evant variables κ(φ), we compute MN  κ(φ) using the leaf node optimiza-
tion. This is again a structured model. Since the values in MN are formulas,
MN  κ(φ) is represented as a formula of quantified boolean logic. We then
process this formula from the leaves to the root to obtain a binary decision
diagram representing this QBF formula – the variables in this representation
are the variables in κ(φ). The assignments represented by this binary decision
diagram are the worlds of a Kripke structure.
The observable variables yield binary relations over these worlds, defined by
w ∼i w′ if for all variables v ∈ Oi, we have w(vγN (v)) = w′(vγN (v)). These
relations correspond to an agent with perfect perfect recall observing variables
Oi. The relations can similarly be represented by binary decision diagrams. This
yields a symbolic representation of the Kripke structure using binary decision
diagrams.
A standard symbolic evaluation procedure for modal logic can then be used
to compute a BDD representing the set of worlds where ¬φ holds. We check
this for emptiness to decide M |= φ.
8 Experimental Results
In the present section, we describe the results of a number of experiments de-
signed to evaluate the performance of epistemic model checking using the condi-
tional independence optimization, in comparison with the existing implementa-
tion in MCK. (Since MCK remains the only symbolic epistemic model checker
that deals with perfect recall knowledge, there are no other systems to compare
to.) All experiments were conducted on an Intel 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 processor
with 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory running Mac OSX 10.10.
The experiments conducted are based on a number of examples of epistemic
model checking applications that have previously been considered in the litera-
ture. Most concern security protocols. Each experiment scales according to a
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single numerical parameter, and we measure the running time of model check-
ing a formula as a function of this parameter. Details of the protocols and the
way that they are represented in the MCK scripting language when using the
conditional independence optimization are presented in Appendix A.3
The performance of the conditional independence optimization depends on
the extent to which it is able to reduce the number of variables that need to
be handled in the ultimate BDD calculation that implements model checking.
Theoretically, in the worst case, there is no reduction in the number of variables.
We have therefore deliberately chosen some examples in which the reduction
is realised in order to demonstrate its power when it applies. However, the
examples are realistic in that they derive from prior, independently motivated
work.
Except where indicated, the unoptimized model checking algorithm against
which we compare is that invoked by the construct spec spr xn in the MCK
scripting language, which operates as already described above. (We refer to this
algorithm as xn in legends, and the algorithm using conditional independence
optimization is referenced as ci.) The results demonstrate both significant
speedups of as large as four orders of magnitude, as well as a significant increase
in the scale of problem that can be handled in a give amount of time.
Due to nondeterminism in the underlying CUDD package [29] used by MCK
for binary decision diagram computations, the running times can show signif-
icant variance from run to run, with some runs taking very large amounts of
time. We have dealt with this variance by concentrating on the minimal run-
ning time obtained over three runs of the experiments. This form of aggregation
can be justified as equivalent to the running time obtained when running three
copies of the computation in parallel and taking the answer from the first to
complete.
Even with this allowance, the plot of running times as we scale the experi-
ments can be very jagged on larger instances. The problem tends to affect the
unoptimized running times more than the running times using the conditional
independence optimization, which generally give smooth curves. We believe this
is due to memory placement effects on larger BDD’s, and because the BDD’s for
the unoptimized running times reach the critical size significantly earlier. We
expect that a similar phenomenom will occur with the optimized version once
this critical BDD size is reached.
3The scripts are presented using a version of MCK’s language under development for an
upcoming release – this is more elegant than earlier versions, and we developed the imple-
mentation of the optimization to work with the new language. The performance of model
checking is sensitive to the encoding of a script to the quantified boolean formulas used by
the model checking algorithms. Because the unoptimized model checker had not yet been
fully adapted to the new language at the time we conducted this work, we used alternate but
logically equivalent scripts for the running times of the non-optimized computation. These
scripts were chosen so as to minimize the running times for the non-optimized version, so as
to best advantage the non-optimized version in the competition. (Even with this advantage
to the non-optimized version, the optimization generally wins.)
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n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
xn 0.1 0.16 0.37 0.65 1.34 2.52 37.92 33.5 846.19 2775.4
Table 1: Dining Cryptographers experiments, unoptimized running times (s)
8.1 Dining Cryptographers
Our first example is the Dining Cryptographers protocol [10], as discussed in
Section 3. This scales by the number n of agents; the number of state variables
is O(n), and the protocol runs for 3 steps. The initial condition needs to say
that at most one of the agents paid – this is done by means of a formula of size
O(n2). The rest of the script scales linearly. The formula in all instances states
that at time 3, agent C0 either knows that no agent pays, knows that C0 is the
payer, or knows that one of the other cryptographers is the payer, but does not
know which. This involves O(n) atomic propositions, and is of linear size in n.
Performance results for model checking the Dining Cryptographers protocol
running on a ring with n agents are shown in Table 1. There is a rapid blowup
as the number of agents is increased: 12 agents already takes over 46 minutes
(2775 seconds).
By contrast, applying the conditional independence optimization, model
checking is significantly more efficient, as shown by the plot in Figure 7. The
case of 12 agents is handled in 0.05 seconds, and 100 agents are handled in 9.69
seconds.
8.2 One-time Pad
The next example concerns message transmission using one-time pad encryption
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Each instance has three agents (Alice, who
sends an encrypted message to Bob, and Eve, who taps the wire). We scale the
example by the length of the message, which is sent one bit at a time. For a
message of length n, states have O(n) variables. The protocol runs 2n steps,
two for each bit. The formula is evaluated at time 2n, and says that Eve does
not learn the value of the first bit.
For this example, we found that the best performance for the unoptimized
version was obtained using MCK version 0.5.1, which used a different encoding
from more recent versions. Performance of model checking is shown in Table 2.
The running times for the optimized version grow very slowly (the numbers
show a step-like behaviour due to rounding). Intuitively, the conditional inde-
pendence optimization detects in this example that the first bit and the others
are independent, and uses this to optimize the model checking computation.
This means that for all n, the ultimate BDD model checking computation is
performed on the same model for all n, and the primary running time cost lies
in the generation of the dependence graph, and its analysis, that precedes the
BDD computation. On the other hand, the unoptimized (xn) model checking
running times show significant growth, with a large spike towards the end, where
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Figure 7: Dining Cryptographers experiments, optimized running times (s)
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the speedup obtained from the optimization is over 10,000 times.
8.3 Oblivious Transfer
The next example concerns an oblivious transfer protocol due to Rivest [25],
which allows Bob to learn exactly one of Alice’s two messages m0,m1, of his
choice, without Alice knowing which message was chosen by Bob. Each instance
has two agents, and we scale by the length of the message. For a message of
length n, states have O(n) variables. We consider two formulas for this protocol.
Both are evaluated at time 3 in all instances.
The first formula says that if Bob chose to receive message m1, then he
does not learn the first bit of m0. The running times for model checking this
formula are given in Table 3. In this example, the conditional independence
optimization gives a significant speedup, in the range of one to two orders of
magnitude (more precisely, 12 to 221) improvement on the inputs considered,
and increasing as the scale of the problem increases.
Running just the optimized version on larger instances, we obtain the plot
shown in Figure 8. This shows that the optimization allows us to handle signif-
icantly larger instances: up to 97 agents can be handled in under 200 seconds,
compared with 19 agents in 170 seconds unoptimized.
An example in which the optimization does not always yield a performance
improvement arises when we change the formula model checked in this example
to one that states that if Bob chose to receive m1, then he does not learn the
value of any bit of m0. The running times are shown in Table 4.
Here, the optimization initially gives a speedup of roughly one order of mag-
nitude, but on the three largest examples, the performance of the unoptimized
algorithm is better by a factor of two. The lower size of the initial speedup,
compared to the first formula, can be explained from the fact that are obviously
fewer variables that are independent of the second formula, since the formula
itself contains more variables. (The “all bits” formula contains O(n) rather than
just one variable explicitly, but recall that knowledge operators implicitly intro-
duce more variables, so the “first bit” formula implicitly has O(n) variables.) It
is not immediately clear exactly what accounts for the switchover.
8.4 Message Transmission
The next example concerns the transmission of a single bit message across a
channel that is guaranteed to deliver it, but with uncertain delay This example
has two agents Alice and Bob , and runs for n+1 steps, where n is the maximum
delay. States have O(n) variables. The formula considered states at time n+ 1
that Alice knows that Bob knows ... (nested five levels) that the message has
arrived. Because of the nesting, the algorithm used in the unoptimized case is
that invoked by the MCK construct spec spr nested – this essentially performs
BDD-based model checking in a structure in which the worlds are runs of length
equal to the maximum time relevant to the formula.
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n ci (s) xn (s) xn/ci
3 0.01 0.03 3
4 0.01 0.08 8
5 0.01 0.10 10
6 0.01 0.18 18
7 0.01 0.27 27
8 0.01 0.35 35
9 0.01 0.52 52
10 0.02 0.52 26
11 0.02 1.25 63
12 0.02 1.38 69
13 0.02 2.04 102
14 0.02 2.19 110
15 0.02 3.98 199
16 0.03 5.50 183
17 0.03 5.01 167
18 0.03 5.47 182
19 0.03 7.24 241
20 0.04 9.71 243
21 0.04 8.42 211
22 0.04 8.82 221
23 0.04 11.10 278
24 0.04 17.88 447
25 0.04 36.68 917
26 0.04 33.26 832
27 0.05 23.60 472
28 0.05 34.88 698
29 0.05 99.50 1990
30 0.05 50.10 1002
31 0.05 75.13 1503
32 0.05 67.37 1347
33 0.06 97.23 1621
34 0.06 184.19 3070
35 0.06 89.47 1491
36 0.07 131.74 1882
37 0.07 164.76 2354
38 0.07 259.48 3707
39 0.07 275.87 3941
40 0.07 749.88 10713
Table 2: One-time pad protocol, optimized and unoptimized running times,
and speedup ratio, “single-bit” formula
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n ci (s) xn (s) xn/ci
3 0.02 0.24 12
4 0.03 0.52 17
5 0.05 0.90 18
6 0.07 1.80 26
7 0.11 2.24 20
8 0.14 3.54 25
9 0.15 4.97 33
10 0.16 7.20 45
11 0.21 13.08 62
12 0.26 16.68 64
13 0.32 32.72 102
14 0.39 62.08 159
15 0.43 50.95 118
16 0.50 36.73 73
17 0.60 38.36 64
18 0.71 69.27 98
19 0.77 170.16 221
20 1.09 148.56 136
Table 3: Rivest Oblivious Transfer Protocol, optimized and unoptimized run-
ning times, and speedup ratio, “single-bit” formula
n ci (s) xn (s) xn/ci
3 0.03 0.25 8.3
4 0.05 0.51 10.2
5 0.12 0.86 7.2
6 0.15 1.58 10.5
7 0.25 2.84 11.4
8 0.42 3.52 8.4
9 0.50 5.11 10.2
10 0.55 7.79 14.2
11 1.18 13.07 11.1
12 3.72 14.63 3.9
13 5.20 39.74 7.6
14 7.13 48.64 6.8
15 4.91 56.62 11.5
16 20.16 38.09 1.9
17 32.95 42.40 1.3
18 174.96 86.81 0.5
19 229.85 96.86 0.4
20 342.40 184.08 0.5
Table 4: Rivest Oblivious Transfer Protocol, optimized and unoptimized run-
ning times, and speedup ratio, “all bits” formula
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Figure 8: Oblivious transfer protocol experiments, optimized running times,
“single-bit” formula
30
n ci (s) nested(s) nested/ci
3 0.01 0.02 2
4 0.01 0.03 3
5 0.01 0.04 4
6 0.01 0.06 6
7 0.01 0.11 11
8 0.02 0.20 10
9 0.03 0.46 15
10 0.03 1.05 35
11 0.05 2.44 49
12 0.07 5.69 81
13 0.09 14.5 161
14 0.12 34.77 290
15 0.16 89.31 558
16 0.20 360.3 1802
17 0.27 1597.91 5918
Table 5: Message Transmission Protocol, optimized and unoptimized running
times, and speedup ratio
Table 5 compares the performance of the conditional independence optimiza-
tion with this algorithm. The degree of optimization obtained is significant,
increasing to over four orders of magnitude.
Running the optimization for larger instances, we obtain the plot of running
times in Figure 9. We again have that the optimization enables significantly
larger instances to be handled in a given amount of time: as many as 65 agents
in 342 seconds, compared to just 16 agents in 360 seconds for the unoptimized
version.
8.5 Chaum’s two-phase protocol
The final example we consider is Chaum’s two-phase protocol [10], a protocol for
anonymous broadcast that uses multiple rounds of the Dining Cryptographers
protocol. Model checking of this protocol has previously been addressed in [1].
This example scales by both the number of agents and the number of steps
of the protocol: with n agents, the protocol runs for O(n) steps, and each state
is comprised of O(n) variables. We check a formula with O(n) variables that
says that the first agent has a bit rcvd1 set to true at the end of the protocol
iff it knows that some other agent is trying to send bit 1.
The protocol is more complex than the others considered above. An ini-
tial set of n “booking” rounds of the Dining Cryptographers protocol is used
to anonymously attempt to book one of n slots, and this is followed by n
“slot” rounds of the Dining Cryptographers protocol, in which an agent who
has booked a slot without detecting a collision with another agent’s booking,
uses that slot to attempt to broadcast a message. Because undetected book-
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Figure 9: Message Transmission Protocol, optimized running times
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n ci (s) xn (s)
3 0.04 0.79
4 0.11 96.47
5 0.49 > 2 hrs
6 2.46 -
7 12.93 -
8 155.41 -
9 > 2hrs -
Table 6: Chaum’s two-phase protocol, optimized and unoptimized running
times
ing collisions remain possible, collisions might also be detected in the second
phase. Because of the complexity of the protocol, this example can only be
model checked on small instances in reasonable time, even with the optimiza-
tion. Table 6 shows the running times obtained: for the unoptimized version,
we again used MCK-0.5.1.
The running time of the unoptimized computation explodes at n = 5 as we
increase the number of agents. The optimized computation is significantly less,
but also eventually explodes, at n = 9. Thus, the optimization has doubled the
size of the problem that can be handled in reasonable time.
9 Related Work and Conclusion
We conclude with a discussion of some related work and future directions.
Wilson and Mengin [34] have previously related modal logic to valuation
algebra, but their definition requires that the marginalization of a Kripke struc-
ture have exactly the same set of worlds and equivalence relation, and merely
restricts the assignment at each world, so their approach does not give the op-
timization that we have developed, and a model checking approach based on it
would be less efficient than that developed in the present paper. They do not
discuss conditional independence, which is a key part of our approach.
Also related are probabilistic programs, a type of program containing prob-
abilistic choice statements, that sample from a specified distribution. The se-
mantics of such programs is that they generate a probability distribution over
the outputs. These programs may contain statements of the form observe(φ)
where φ is a boolean condition: these are interpreted as conditioning the dis-
tribution constructed to that point on the condition φ. Hur et al. [17] develop
an approach to slicing probabilistic programs based on a static analysis that
incorporates ideas from the Bayesian net literature. There are several differ-
ences between probabilistic programs and our work in this paper. One is that
we deal with discrete knowledge rather than probability – in general, this makes
our model checking problem more tractable. We also reason about all possible
sequences of observations, rather than one particular sequence of observations.
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Additionally, we allow observations by multiple agents rather than just one.
Finally, via knowledge operators, we have a locus of reference to observations
in our framework that is located in formulas rather than inside the program
– this enables us to ask multiple questions about a program without changing
the code, whereas in probabilistic programs, one would need to handle this by
multiple distinct modifications of the code.
The results of the present paper concern formulas that refer (directly and
through knowledge operators) only to a specific time. Our approach, however,
can be easily extended by means of a straightforward transformation to formulas
that talk about multiple time points, and we intend to implement this extension
in future work.
The technique we have developed can also be extended to deal with multi-
agent models based on programs taking probabilistic transitions, which MCK
already supports. Formulas in this extension would include operators that talk
about an agent’s subjective probability, given what it has observed.
Other extensions we intend to implement are to enrich the range of knowl-
edge semantics beyond the synchronous perfect recall semantics treated in this
paper: essentially the same techniques will apply to the clock semantics (in
which an agent’s knowledge is based on just its current observation and the
current time). The observational semantics, in which the agent’s knowledge is
based just on its current observation, will be more challenging, since it is asyn-
chronous, and knowledge formulas may refer to times arbitrarily far into the
future.
Finally, whereas the present paper concentrated on straightline programs, we
intend to extend to a richer protocol format, including conditionals. In general,
this extension will diminish the power of the equality optimization, and result in
an increased set of dependencies in which many variables become dependent on
a variable representing the program counter. However, some extensions will be
more managable, e.g., one that requires conditionals and loops to be balanced
in their timing (a restriction already used in work on computer security to avoid
unwanted information leakages).
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A Details of Experiments
In this appendix we provide further details on the examples considered in our
experiments.
The MCK scripts below start with a declaration of global variables, followed
by the “init_cond” construct which gives a boolean formula describing the
initial states of the model. This is followed by the declaration of the agents
in model. Each declaration names the agent, gives the name of the protocol it
runs (in quotes), followed by the binding of the parameters of this protocol to
environment variables. The protocols are listed last in the script. All of the
agent protocols are straightline. The bracket notation “<| ... |>” delimits
atomic actions. The contents of these brackets are a sequence of assignments
that execute atomically, without consuming time.
The intuitive operational semantics of the scripts is that at time n, the agents
activate the next such action in the sequence. These actions are performed
in the order of the agents listed, followed by the sequence of assignments in
the “transitions” clause, which intuitively, describes events that happen in the
environment at each step. The resulting state is then taken to be the state at
time n+ 1.
Specifications are listed using the construct “spec_spr”. Here the “spr”
indicates that we are using a synchronous perfect recall semantics for knowledge.
A.1 Dining Cryptographers
The Dining Cryptographers protocol has already been discussed in the body of
the paper, we provide the code for the 3-agent instance below. This example is
generalized to larger instances by increasing the number n of agents: each run-
ning the protocol given. The protocol can be run using any connected network,
but we use a ring network, with agent Ci sharing coins with agent Ci−1 mod n
to the left, and agent agent Ci+1 mod n to the right. The query is stated in
terms of the knowledge of agent C0, and says that this agent either knows that
nobody paid, knows that it paid itself, or knows that one of the other n − 1
agents paid, but does not know which.
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paid : Bool[3]
chan : Bool[3]
said : Bool[3]
init_cond =
((neg paid[1]) /\ (neg paid[2])) \/
((neg paid[0]) /\ (neg paid[2])) \/
((neg paid[0]) /\ (neg paid[1]))
agent C0 "dc_agent_protocol" (paid[0], chan[0], chan[1], said, said[0])
agent C1 "dc_agent_protocol" (paid[1], chan[1], chan[2], said, said[1])
agent C2 "dc_agent_protocol" (paid[2], chan[2], chan[0], said, said[2])
spec_spr_ci = X 3 (Knows C0 ((neg paid[0]) /\ (neg paid[1]) /\ (neg paid[2]))) \/
(Knows C0 (paid[0])) \/
(Knows C0 ( False \/ paid[1]\/ paid[2]) /\
(neg Knows C0 (neg paid[1]))/\ (neg Knows C0 (neg paid[2])))
protocol "dc_agent_protocol"
(
paid : observable Bool,
chan_left : Bool,
chan_right : Bool,
said : observable Bool[], -- the broadcast variables.
say : Bool
)
coin_left : observable Bool
coin_right : observable Bool
begin
<| chan_right := coin_right |>;
<| coin_left := chan_left |>;
<| say := coin_left xor coin_right xor paid |> ;
skip
end
A.2 One Time Pad
The one-time pad is a shared secret key to be used just once. It is known to
give perfect encryption under this assumption. We model a system in which
Alice has a message (a boolean string) to transmit to Bob. She is assumed to
share a one-time pad, another boolean string of the same length as the message,
with Bob. Alice encrypts her string by bitwise exclusive-or with the one-time
pad, and sends the resulting encrypted bits via a channel that is observed by
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an eavesdropper Eve.
We parameterize this model by the length n of the strings. The case of
n = 3 is shown below. We consider a query that states that at the end of the
transmission, Eve does not know the value of the first bit of Alice’s message.
-- The ’secret’ one-time-pad shared between Alice and Bob.
one_time_pad : Bool[3]
-- The communications channel.
channel : Bool
agent Alice "sender" (one_time_pad, channel)
agent Bob "receiver" (one_time_pad, channel)
agent Eve "eavesdropper" (channel)
spec_spr =
X 6 ((neg (Knows Eve Alice.message[0])) /\ (neg (Knows Eve (neg Alice.message[0]))))
-- Alice’s protocol.
protocol "sender" (otp : Bool[3], chan : Bool)
message : Bool[3]
bit : Bool
begin
<| bit := otp[0] |>; <| chan := message[0] xor bit |>;
<| bit := otp[1] |>; <| chan := message[1] xor bit |>;
<| bit := otp[2] |>; <| chan := message[2] xor bit |>
end
-- Bob’s protocol.
protocol "receiver" (otp : observable Bool[3], chan : observable Bool)
begin
skip; skip; skip;
skip; skip; skip
end
-- Eve’s protocol.
protocol "eavesdropper" (chan : observable Bool)
begin
skip; skip; skip;
skip; skip; skip
end
A.3 Rivest’s Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Rivests Oblivious Transfer protocol [25] enables a receiver Bob to obtain exactly
one of two distinct messages m0, m1 possessed by a sender Alice, without Alice
learning which message Bob chose to receive. That is, Bob makes a choice c,
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and, at the end of the protocol, knows message mc, but not the other message
mc, without Alice learning the value of c.
An MCK model of the protocol in the case where the length of the message is
3 is given. The protocol requires that Alice and Bob start with some correlated
randomness which can be provided by a trusted third party who does not need to
be online during the running of the protocol. This trusted third party provides
Alice with two random strings r0, r1, and Bob with a random bit d and the string
rd. We do not model this third party explicitly, but start a the state where Alice
and Bob have received this information. (As with the Dining Cryptographers
protocols above, we model random choices as nondeterministic choices.)
Bob and Alice then exchange some messages computed from the initial in-
formation. Bob first sends a bit e, and Alice responds with two strings f0, f1
that encode m0 and m1. Bob is then able to compute his desired message mc
in the third step of the protocol.
For this protocol, we scale our experiments by the length n of the messages
m0,m1 (the protocol always runs in 3 steps, but the last step is a local com-
putation by Bob, so does not affect the agent’s knowledge). We consider two
formulas:
1. The first “[Single]” says that if Bob chose to receive m1, then he does
not learn the first bit of m0. Because the protocol effectively operates
independently on the bits of the various messages, we expect that the
dependency analysis will detect this independence and give a significant
speedup as the size of the messages increase.
2. The first “[Any]” says that if Bob chose to receive m1, then he does not
learn any bit of m0. This involves n variables, so it is not immediately
clear whether we should expect any optimization.
-- Alice’s messages
m0: Bool[3]
m1: Bool[3]
-- A variable used by Bob to store the message received
mc: Bool[3]
-- initial randomness
r0 : Bool[3]
r1 : Bool[3]
rd : Bool[3]
d : Bool
f0 : Bool[3]
f1 : Bool[3]
e : Bool
c: Bool
init_cond =
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-- Message rd is determined from r0,r1 and d.
( neg d => ((r0[0] <=> rd[0]) /\ (r0[1] <=> rd[1]) /\ (r0[2] <=> rd[2]) )) /\
(d => ((r1[0] <=> rd[0]) /\ (r1[1] <=> rd[1]) /\ (r1[2] <=> rd[2]) )) /\
-- The random strings are distinct.
( neg (r0[0] <=> r1[0]) \/ neg (r0[1] <=> r1[1]) \/ neg (r0[2] <=> r1[2]) ) /\
-- The messages m0, m1 are distinct.
( neg (m0[0] <=> m1[0]) \/ neg (m0[1] <=> m1[1]) \/ neg (m0[2] <=> m1[2]) )
agent Alice "alice" (r0, r1, m0, m1, f0, f1, e)
agent Bob "bob" (e, rd, d, c, f0, f1, mc)
spec_spr =
"[Any]: after two steps, Bob does not know the value of any bit of m0"
X 2 ( c => (neg (Knows Bob m0[0]) /\ neg (Knows Bob neg m0[0]) /\
neg (Knows Bob m0[1]) /\ neg (Knows Bob neg m0[1]) /\
neg (Knows Bob m0[2]) /\ neg (Knows Bob neg m0[2])))
spec_spr =
"[Single]: after two steps, Bob does not know the value of the first bit of m0"
X 2 (neg (Knows Bob m0[0]) /\ neg (Knows Bob neg m0[0]))
spec_spr = "[Alice] Alice does not learn Bob’s choice: "
X 3 ( (neg Knows Alice c) /\ (neg Knows Alice neg c ) )
protocol "alice" (r0 : observable Bool[3], r1: observable Bool[3],
m0 : observable Bool[3], m1: observable Bool[3],
f0 : observable Bool[3], f1: observable Bool[3],
e: observable Bool)
begin
skip;
<|
f0[0]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m0[0] xor r0[0])) \/ (e /\ (m0[0] xor r1[0])) ;
f1[0]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m1[0] xor r1[0])) \/ (e /\ (m1[0] xor r0[0])) ;
f0[1]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m0[1] xor r0[1])) \/ (e /\ (m0[1] xor r1[1])) ;
f1[1]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m1[1] xor r1[1])) \/ (e /\ (m1[1] xor r0[1])) ;
f0[2]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m0[2] xor r0[2])) \/ (e /\ (m0[2] xor r1[2])) ;
f1[2]:= ( (neg e) /\ (m1[2] xor r1[2])) \/ (e /\ (m1[2] xor r0[2]))
|>;
skip
end
protocol "bob" (e: Bool,
rd: observable Bool[3], d: observable Bool, c: observable Bool,
f0: observable Bool[3], f1: observable Bool[3], mc: observable Bool[3])
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begin
<| e:= d xor c |>;
skip;
<|
mc[0]:= ((neg c) /\ (f0[0] xor rd[0])) \/ (c /\ (f1[0] xor rd[0])) ;
mc[1]:= ((neg c) /\ (f0[1] xor rd[1])) \/ (c /\ (f1[1] xor rd[1])) ;
mc[2]:= ((neg c) /\ (f0[2] xor rd[2])) \/ (c /\ (f1[2] xor rd[2]))
|>
end
A.4 Message Transmission with Uncertain Delay
This example models a scenario where an agent Alice sends a message x to Bob
through a channel with a bounded delay. The example is parameterized by the
maximum length n of the delay. The instance with n = 3 is shown.
Initially, all variables except Alice’s local variable x and the array delay are
0. At time 0, Alice writes the message x to a buffer, and at time 1, Alice sets
a bit to True to start the transmission. The message is delivered as soon as
the value delay [0] is True. Here delay is an array of length n, which initially
has a random value. At each step, the values in the array shift to the left by
one position, and the final value is set to be False. Thus, delay [0] becomes F
by time n at the latest, and the message is guaranteed to be delivered by time
n+ 1.
In this example, we consider a query that involves nested knowledge. It is
the case that Alice considers it possible up to time n+1 that the message has not
yet been delivered, but by time n+ 1 Alice knows that the message must have
been delivered. In fact, it is common knowledge at time n+ 1 that the message
has been delivered. We consider a query that says that Alice Knows that Bob
Knows that Alice Knows that Bob Knows that Alice Knows the message has
been received by Bob.
delay : Bool[3]
outA : Bool
sentA : Bool
inB : Bool
rcdB : Bool
init_cond = neg (sentA \/ outA \/ inB \/ rcdB)
agent Alice "sender" (outA, sentA)
agent Bob "receiver" (inB, rcdB)
transitions
begin
-- delay[0] captures whether transmission is delayed in the current step
-- if there is no delay and Alice has sent, then Bob receives
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rcdB := rcdB \/ (neg delay[0] /\ sentA );
inB := (neg delay[0] /\ sentA /\ outA) \/ ((delay[0] \/ neg sentA) /\ inB);
-- delay starts out random, and shifts from right to left
delay[0] := delay[1] ;
delay[1] := delay[2];
delay[2] := False
end
spec_spr = X 4 Knows Alice (Knows Bob (Knows Alice (Knows Bob (Knows Alice rcdB ))))
-- Alice’s protocol.
protocol "sender" (chan : Bool, sent : Bool )
x: Bool
begin
<| chan := x |> ;
<| sent := True |> ;
skip; skip; skip
end
-- Bob’s protocol.
protocol "receiver" (chanin: observable Bool, rcd: observable Bool)
begin
skip; skip; skip; skip
end
A.5 Two-Phase Protocol
In the Dining Cryptographers protocol, it is assumed that at most one agent
wishes to communicate the message that they paid. The two-phase protocol,
also from [10], is an application of the basic Dining Cryptographers protocol,
in which multiple rounds of the basic dining cryptographers protocol are used
to allow anonymous broadcast in a setting where multiple agents may have a
message to send.
We model an abstraction of this protocol, in which the message of each
agent consists of a single bit, and each application of Dining Cryptographers
scheme is represented by taking the exclusive-or of the bits contributed to the
round by each of the agents. It is shown in [1] that this abstraction is sound for
verification of epistemic properties.
The protocol operates in two phases. The second phase consists of some
number m of rounds of the basic Dining Cryptographers protocol, which some
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agent may use to anonymously broadcast a message. Of course, to remain
anonymous, the slot in which it chooses to broadcast must not be predictable,
so the agent must choose its slot randomly. This creates the risk of collisions, in
which two agents broadcast in the same slot. This is problematic: the Dining
Cryptographers protocol assumes that at most one agent is sending a message.
To decrease the risk of a collision, in the first phase, any agent with a message
to broadcast attempts to book one of the broadcast slots. To maintain its
anonymity, the booking of a slot must also be done anonymously, and the Dining
Cryptographers protocol is also used by the agent to announce that it wishes to
use its chosen slot. Thus, the first phase also consists of m rounds of the Dining
Cryptographers protocol.
Some collisions can be detected during the first round – in particular, if
an even number of agents attempt to book the same slot, they will detect the
collision from the outcome of that booking round. There remains the possibility
of undetected collisions — the idea of the protocol is that these will be detected
during the transmission round, and that in this case, the agent will make another
attempt to transmit in a later run of the protocol.
This makes the precise conditions under which it is known that a message
has been successfully transmitted using the two-phase protocol quite subtle.
For a longer discussion of the subtleties, see [1]. We focus on one of the simpler
queries from that analysis, concerning whether an agent knows that some other
agent is transmitting a particular bit.
In the script, the boolean array slotsCi is used to represent which slot, if
any, agent Ci has selected for its transmission; slotsCi[0] represents that the
agent has nothing to transmit. The initial condition states that at exactly one
of slotsCi[j] holds, for j = 0 . . . n. The variables rri are used to capture the
results of the reservation round i during the first phase. These values are then
used during the corresponding round of the transmission phase to determine
whether a value has been received in that round. Variable rcvdX for X ∈ {0, 1}
is used to represent that a bit X has been received.
This example scales by increasing the number of agents or increasing the
number of available slots. We have experimented with two versions, one where
the number of slots is fixed at 5, and we vary the number of agents, and another,
where we vary the number of agents and keep this equal to the number of slots.
The query that we consider states that the variable rcvd1 corresponds pre-
cisely to the agent knowing that some agent is transmitting the bit 1. (We verify
this for agent C0, it holds for the others by symmetry.)
type Slot = {0..3}
slotsC0 : Bool[Slot]
slotsC1 : Bool[Slot]
slotsC2 : Bool[Slot]
say : Bool[3]
round_result : Bool
init_cond =
(neg (slotsC0[0] /\ slotsC0[1])) /\ (neg (slotsC0[0] /\ slotsC0[2])) /\
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(neg (slotsC0[0] /\ slotsC0[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC0[1] /\ slotsC0[2])) /\
(neg (slotsC0[1] /\ slotsC0[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC0[2] /\ slotsC0[3])) /\
(neg (slotsC1[0] /\ slotsC1[1])) /\ (neg (slotsC1[0] /\ slotsC1[2])) /\
(neg (slotsC1[0] /\ slotsC1[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC1[1] /\ slotsC1[2])) /\
(neg (slotsC1[1] /\ slotsC1[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC1[2] /\ slotsC1[3])) /\
(neg (slotsC2[0] /\ slotsC2[1])) /\ (neg (slotsC2[0] /\ slotsC2[2])) /\
(neg (slotsC2[0] /\ slotsC2[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC2[1] /\ slotsC2[2])) /\
(neg (slotsC2[1] /\ slotsC2[3])) /\ (neg (slotsC2[2] /\ slotsC2[3])) /\
(slotsC0[0] \/ slotsC0[1] \/ slotsC0[2] \/ slotsC0[3]) /\
(slotsC1[0] \/ slotsC1[1] \/ slotsC1[2] \/ slotsC1[3]) /\
(slotsC2[0] \/ slotsC2[1] \/ slotsC2[2] \/ slotsC2[3])
agent C0 "twophase_protocol" (slotsC0, say[0], round_result)
agent C1 "twophase_protocol" (slotsC1, say[1], round_result)
agent C2 "twophase_protocol" (slotsC2, say[2], round_result)
transitions
begin
round_result := say[0] xor say[1] xor say[2]
end
-- rcvdX = I know someone else is sending X
spec_spr = X 13 C0.rcvd1 <=>
Knows C0 ((neg slotsC1[0] /\ C1.message) \/ (neg slotsC2[0] /\ C2.message))
protocol "twophase_protocol"
(
slot_request: observable Bool[],
say : Bool,
round_result: observable Bool
)
-- the following variables are initialised nondeterministically:
-- the message the agent sends, if any
message : observable Bool
-- the result for each DC round
-- rri = message received in booking round i
rr1 : Bool
rr2 : Bool
rr3 : Bool
-- rcvdX = I know a message X has been sent by someone else
rcvd0 : Bool
rcvd1 : Bool
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begin
-- reservation phase
-- time 0
<| say := slot_request[1] |>;
<| rr1 := round_result |>;
<| say := slot_request[2] |>;
<| rr2 := round_result |>;
<| say := slot_request[3] |>;
<| rr3 := round_result |>;
--initialize rcvd vars
<| rcvd0:= False ; rcvd1 := False |>;
-- Sending phase:
<| say := (slot_request[1] /\ rr1 /\ message ) |> ;
<|
rcvd1 := rcvd1 \/ (neg slot_request[1] /\ rr1 /\ round_result) \/
(slot_request[1] /\ rr1 /\ (message xor round_result));
rcvd0 := rcvd0 \/ (neg slot_request[1] /\ rr1 /\ neg round_result) \/
(slot_request[1] /\ rr1 /\ (message xor round_result))
|> ;
<| say := (slot_request[2] /\ rr2 /\ message ) |> ;
<|
rcvd1 := rcvd1 \/ (neg slot_request[2] /\ rr2 /\ round_result) \/
(slot_request[2] /\ rr2 /\ (message xor round_result));
rcvd0 := rcvd0 \/ (neg slot_request[2] /\ rr2 /\ neg round_result) \/
(slot_request[2] /\ rr2 /\ (message xor round_result))
|> ;
<| say := (slot_request[3] /\ rr3 /\ message ) |> ;
<|
rcvd1 := rcvd1 \/ (neg slot_request[3] /\ rr3 /\ round_result) \/
(slot_request[3] /\ rr3 /\ (message xor round_result));
rcvd0 := rcvd0 \/ (neg slot_request[3] /\ rr3 /\ neg round_result) \/
(slot_request[3] /\ rr3 /\ (message xor round_result))
|>
end
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